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Changes to Canada’s immigration and refugee determina-
tion policies made since 2012 have increased the occurrence 
and persistence of temporariness in Canada, contributing 
to the systematic exclusion of a growing number of non-
citizens, who live and work on the territory, from a wide 
range of rights. From the perspective of temporariness, I 
illustrate the striking similarities in the state’s approach 
to two seemingly distinct groups of non-citizens (based on 
their rationale for admission): low-skilled temporary for-
eign workers and refugee claimants. Both groups occupy 
a low rung in the hierarchy of rights and entitlements to 
citizenship in Canada, inevitably affecting their social and 
economic outcomes in the host society. In conclusion, I 
argue that there is still much to be gained by viewing these 
distinct groups of temporary migrants as theoretically and 
experientially linked, in order to design effective policy and 
deter Canada from repeating its dark and exclusionary 
migratory past.
Résumé
Les changements aux politiques canadiennes d’immigra-
tion et d’admission au statut de réfugié depuis 2012 ont 
augmenté le caractère temporaire des séjours au Canada, 
contribuant ainsi à l’exclusion systématique d’accès d’un 
nombre croissant d’étrangers vivant et travaillant sur le 
territoire canadien à une variété de droits. Du point de vue 
de la précarité, cet article montre les ressemblances impor-
tantes dans la façon que sont considérés deux groupes dis-
tincts d’étrangers du point de leur admission : les travail-
leurs étrangers non qualifiés, et les demandeurs d’asile. Ces 
deux groupes occupent des places inférieures dans la hié-
rarchie des droits et de l’accès à la citoyenneté canadienne, 
ce qui affecte invariablement leur place sociale et écono-
mique dans la société. En conclusion, on avance qu’il y a 
beaucoup d’avantages à considérer ensemble, sur les plans 
théoriques et pratiques, ces deux groupes de migrants tem-
poraires, afin de concevoir des politiques plus efficaces et 
d’éviter que le Canada répète les erreurs de sa triste et dis-
criminatoire histoire en matière de migration.
Introduction
Immigration has been recognized as a cornerstone of nation building in Canada since Confederation in 1867. The chapter of Canadian immigration history discussed 
in this article begins during the post-Confederation settler 
era but is focused on the changes to immigration and refugee 
determination policies made since 2012. Historically, rights 
and entitlements to membership in the Canadian state were 
premised on territorial presence and the granting of perma-
nent status. Contemporary membership in Canada’s socio-
political community is the ascription of permanent resident 
status and/or citizenship by the state. Incorporation into 
the nation remains more subjective. Nation refers generally 
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to a sentiment of solidarity based on cultural similarity, but 
more importantly mutual recognition.1 Canadian national-
ity incorporates both of these elements and assigns an indi-
vidual a place in the community and a say in the effective 
control of the state.
Canada, as an entity, can exercise sovereignty or control 
over its territory to some extent, epitomized by its immigra-
tion and refugee determination policies that are designed 
to reflect Canada’s interests. By attaching specific rules and 
codes to each entry category, Canada effectively creates a 
hierarchy of rights to stay, access to the labour market, and 
entitlements to state membership for all non-citizens. Much 
like designating citizenship, designating “illegality” assigns 
an individual a political and juridical identity, as well as a 
specific social relation to the state. States perceive unwanted 
and/or illegal migration as an affront to national sover-
eignty. The “illegalization” and “criminalization” of some 
migrations, therefore, is intricately connected to a perceived 
“loss of control” by the government.2
Canada has responded to the wake of perceived threats 
to national security, heightened in the post-9/11 era, con-
cerns over the perceived diminishment of control over its 
borders, and a dilution of national identity, by expanding 
its “security perimeter”—an ever-growing and ever-present 
discursive security blanket with a vague functional defini-
tion.3 Despite the active expansion of this blanket, Canada 
continues to accept what it considers to be unwanted immi-
gration of persons it does not actively solicit.
Gary Freeman explains this passive acceptance of 
unwanted immigration by disaggregating migration policy 
into four distinct policy arenas: (1) managing legal migra-
tion through migration planning and selecting migrants to 
meet specific nationally prescribed immigration objectives; 
(2) controlling illegal migration by implementing border 
controls, employer sanctions, and visa requirements; (3) 
administering temporary worker programs; and (4) refugee 
determination and processing of what the state considers to 
be genuine asylum claims. This disaggregation of migration 
policy suggests that sweeping assessments of state control 
over its borders, even within the contemporary securitiza-
tion era, must be replaced with more limited and specific 
claims.4
Historically, Canada has always passively accepted 
unwanted immigration, particularly for humanitarian rea-
sons, following the ratification of internationally legislated 
refugee protocols. Over time, it has also had to recognize 
individual rights, specifically for family reunification of 
labour migrants, invoked in the Canadian Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms, and the pragmatic challenges of controlling 
“illegal” migration.5 As a post-9/11 securitized state, Canada 
has made concerted efforts to ensure that immigration and 
refugee determination, in tandem with citizenship laws, are 
associated with the essence of the nation, effectively trans-
forming migration and refugee laws into the “last bastion of 
sovereignty.”6
This article examines how Canada maximizes its limited 
sovereignty in administering migration and refugee claims, 
evident in the changes to the temporary worker programs 
and the processing of in-land asylum claims made since 
2012. The argument is presented in two parts. First, I argue 
that these changes have increased the occurrence and per-
sistence of temporariness for specific groups of migrants in 
Canada, contributing to the systematic exclusion of these 
growing numbers of non-citizens, who live and work in 
the territory, from a wide range of rights (including perma-
nent status and/or citizenship, work, access to provincial 
workplace standards, and social assistance). Second, in 
adopting the perspective of temporariness, I argue that the 
recent changes illustrate striking similarities in the state’s 
approach to two specific categories of non-citizens: low-
skilled temporary foreign workers and refugee claimants.
Scholarly discussion on temporary foreign workers 
and refugee claimants often places them in analytical and 
political silos, in part as a result of the distinct rationales 
for admitting these two groups of migrants. This article 
is not intended to be a robust comparison by any account, 
but instead selects specific aspects of admission proced-
ures, access to social assistance (with a focus on Ontario), 
provisions for family reunification, and entitlements to 
permanent status and citizenship, as they apply to these two 
groups. These seemingly distinct groups occupy a low rung 
in the hierarchy of rights and entitlements to citizenship in 
Canada, inevitably affecting their social and economic out-
comes in the host society.
The Evolution of Temporariness in Canada
Canadian immigration policy has many purported goals, 
including humanitarian, family reunification, and foreign 
policy; however, a primary historical and contemporary 
use of immigration policy is as a tool of economic policy to 
meet immediate shortages in the labour market. Temporary 
foreign worker programs have always played a key role in 
meeting this objective. The historical programs designed 
primarily to recruit foreign domestic help and farm labour 
first paved the pathways for temporariness in Canada.
The delegation of domestic work to foreign women is 
a longstanding practice in Canada. Young English and 
Scottish women served British-Canadian families from the 
1890s to the 1920s, followed by Eastern European refugee 
women during the Second World War, who served one year 
as indentured domestics. The growing shortages of domes-
tic help in the 1950s were met with special programs for 
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German women to enter Canada to become permanent resi-
dents, later expanded to include Italian and Greek women. 
The Caribbean Domestic Scheme, characterized by the most 
restrictive and coercive practices, was the first program of 
its kind to recruit women of colour to work as domestic 
workers in Canada (as opposed to white women arriving 
through earlier programs), but these women were categor-
ically denied the right to permanent residence.7 Foreign 
farm workers were recruited through short-term permits, 
with no entitlements to permanent status, which emerged 
out of separate bilateral agreements with the Mexican and 
Caribbean governments.
The Non-Immigrant Employment Authorization 
Program (NIEAP), established in January 1973, replaced 
these dispersed and diverse temporary worker programs. 
NIEAP was intended to allow the Canadian government 
and employers to use immigration policy to meet short-term 
market interests more flexibly and effectively.8 Temporary 
foreign workers (TFWs) were restricted to a specific job 
and employer. The NIEAP eventually evolved into a bifur-
cated program with two general streams: one targeted at 
high-skilled workers and the other at low-skilled workers. 
This bifurcation persists in the contemporary Temporary 
Foreign Worker Program (TFWP), which has “undergone 
seismic changes in its purpose, size and target popula-
tions.”9 The number of temporary foreign workers present 
in Canada (on 1 December) rose by 148 per cent between 
2002 and 2008. Since 2008, the number of temporary for-
eign workers admitted annually overtook the number of 
permanent residents, in a trend that has continued since.10
Temporariness in Canada implies limited rights based on 
temporality (often limiting period of stay) and condition-
ality (rights conditional upon behaviour such as require-
ments to satisfy a specific employer to remain in the coun-
try).11 The number of persons holding temporary status in 
Canada is diverse, demonstrating a multitude of forms of 
temporariness. Specific to economic and labour migrants, 
Rajkumar et al. (2012)12 have conceptualized the forms of 
temporariness on the basis of a temporary-permanent div-
ide: a permeable paper border for the transnational elite that 
is less permeable for the majority of temporary migrants. 
Canada offers privileged forms of temporariness and inclu-
sive membership to those categorized as high-skilled while 
reserving restrictive and restricting forms of temporariness 
for those categorized as “low-skilled.”
Rajkumar et al. (2012) identify three primary categories: 
(1) temporarily temporary (e.g., high-skilled temporary for-
eign workers who are eligible for expedited permanent resi-
dency through the Canadian Experience Class), (2) perma-
nently temporary (e.g., seasonal agricultural workers), and 
(3) temporarily permanent (e.g., foreign-born permanent 
residents who could be deported upon violation of immi-
gration and security laws). For the purposes of the discus-
sion in this article, within the temporarily temporary cat-
egory I would include asylum seekers awaiting a decision on 
their claim, which could result in permanent residence, if 
they are granted refugee status, or deportation if rejected. In 
the next two sections, I shall discuss the two distinct groups 
of non-citizens that demonstrate some striking similarities.
Low-Skilled Temporary Foreign Workers
The hallmark of the contemporary Temporary Foreign 
Worker Program is a formalized distinction between 
high-skilled and low-skilled work, in accordance with the 
National Occupational Classification, which the Canadian 
government uses to describe all work performed in the 
labour market. High-skilled temporary foreign workers 
(HTFWs) fall within Skill Level 0 (management occupa-
tions), A (occupations that require university education), 
or B (occupations that usually require college or vocational 
education or apprenticeship training). Low-skilled tem-
porary foreign workers (LTFWs) fall within Skill Level C 
(occupations that usually require secondary school and/or 
occupation-specific training) and D (occupations with no 
specific formal educational requirements and that provide 
on-the-job training).13
Demand for TFWs has only grown since the establish-
ment of historical programs to recruit domestic and farm 
labour to meet shortages in the Canadian labour market. 
Canada’s Economic Action Plan 2014 states that Canada 
continues to experience significant skills shortages in many 
sectors and regions, and the TFWP helps to fill genuine and 
acute labour needs in order to create more opportunities 
for Canadians, but not at the cost of displacing Canadian 
workers.14 In the midst of aggressive immigration and 
refugee policy reform in 2012, the hiring of more than 200 
temporary workers from China in northeastern British 
Columbia15 and outsourcing arrangements made by the 
Royal Bank of Canada (RBC)16 sparked outrage from both 
the labour unions and the public, and garnered significant 
media attention. The Canadian government was pressured 
to introduce relevant legislative, regulatory, and adminis-
trative changes, announced under Canada’s Economic Plan 
2013, which were intended to reform the TFWP to respond 
to specific criticisms raised against it.
Despite the introduction of these changes, the numbers 
of temporary foreign workers are rising in all provinces; the 
increase is most pronounced in Alberta, where the largest 
percentage of work permits is issued to workers entering 
low-skilled occupations.17 The growing demand for workers 
in low-skilled occupations across all provinces prompted 
the government to introduce the Pilot Project for Hiring 
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Foreign Workers in Occupations that Require Lower Levels 
of Formal Training (also known as the Low-Skill Pilot 
Project) in 2002. The program was further modified in 2007, 
allowing employers to hire persons for occupations requir-
ing at most a high school diploma or a maximum of two 
years of job-specific training. In the 2012 and 2013 fiscal 
years, the government used the high and persistent demand 
for low-skilled temporary foreign workers as their ration-
ale to make the pilot project a permanent fixture of the 
Canadian immigration system, now called the Stream for 
Lower-Skilled Occupations.
The flagship domestic worker and farm labour schemes 
remained in place but with some semantic and cosmetic 
changes being introduced and implemented. From 1973 
to 1991, all foreign domestic workers were denied citizen-
ship. Despite the introduction of the Points System in 
1967, the low wages of foreign domestic workers prevented 
them from applying as independent-class immigrants. 
Concerns over the harsh reality of the working and living 
conditions of domestic workers led to the creation of the 
1991 Task Force on Immigration Practices and Procedures. 
The Foreign Domestic Movement was implemented in that 
same year and reformulated in 1992 as the Live-In Caregiver 
Program (LCP), permitting foreign domestic workers to 
apply for permanent residence, after completing two years 
of live-in domestic service in a private household. The main 
controversial features of the program remained in place: the 
live-in requirement and dependence on a single employer,18 
notorious for exposing workers to long and undefined work 
hours as a result of the inseparability of work and home and 
a higher potential for abuse and exploitation, since reliance 
on a single employer would mean LCPs would be unlikely to 
file complaints for fear of terminated work permits (forgo-
ing a the opportunity to transition to permanent status in 
Canada) and/or deportation.
The Seasonal Agricultural Worker Program (SAWP) 
replaced NIEAP in 1974 as a government-to-government 
program of managed migration exclusively between Canada 
and Mexico. The day-to-day administration of the program 
is carried out by a non-profit private sector organization, 
Foreign Agricultural Resource Management Services, feder-
ally incorporated in 1988. Work visas are valid for a specific 
job, employer, and time period. Workers live in employer-
provided housing, and employers are required to cover 
certain costs, including transportation and health insur-
ance.19 Workers arriving under SAWP and the Agricultural 
Stream within the Stream for Lower-Skilled Occupations 
are unaffected by the recent reforms to the TFWP, since 
the Canadian government asserts that there continues to 
be labour shortages in this particular industry and that 
unfilled jobs are “truly temporary.”20
Refugee Claimants
Although the manipulation of temporary foreign worker 
programs to meet short-term labour shortages is a way for 
the state to exercise sovereign control over immigration, the 
exigencies of state interdependence in a globalized world, 
and international law that requires states to respect an 
emergent “law of migrants,” requires all liberal-democratic 
states to respect the rights of persons and not just citizens 
(what Christian Joppke calls a novelty of the postwar era).21 
Canada is no exception. In fact, Canada has a history of 
grand gestures of humanitarianism, allowing it to be seen 
as a “refugee haven,” despite horrific historical instances 
of racist exclusion. The volume of historical refugee flows 
to Canada included the influx of United Empire Loyalists 
fleeing the American Revolution, and French Protestants as 
well as fugitive slaves from the United States after the abo-
lition of slavery in Canada in 1834.22 Canada’s humanitar-
ian image was marred, however, by its refusing asylum to 
Jewish refugees in the 1930s, epitomized by the infamous 
statement that “none is too many.”23
Prior to the Second World War, Canadian nationhood 
incorporated ideas of desirable non-citizens as white (pri-
marily Anglo-Saxon) “British subjects,” and restricted the 
work, residency, and family reunification rights of all other 
non-citizens who did not fit these criteria. In the immediate 
aftermath of the war, Canada accepted a significant number 
of “desirable” refugees from Western Europe, Hungary, and 
Czechoslovakia, and limited “undesirable” immigration 
from Asia and the Caribbean. The development of inter-
national legal instruments and basic structures of legal pro-
tection for refugees significantly altered the demographic 
composition of Canadian refugees that arrived following 
the postwar period. After the United Nations Convention 
Relating to the Status of Refugees in 1951 in Geneva, and 
the 1967 United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of 
Refugees were put in place, Canada began accepting refu-
gees from outside the traditional European states, including 
thousands of Asians expelled from East Africa and refugee 
claimants arriving on boats from Southeast Asia.
The rationale for Canada’s racist exclusion incorpor-
ated myriad tropes of the foreign Other, as vector of dis-
ease, agent of subversion, corrupter or the moral order, and 
debaser of national identity, requiring the exteriorization 
of threat, epitomized in the curious case of the public and 
policy reactions to arrivals by ship throughout Canadian 
history. Such arrivals account for approximately 0.2 per 
cent of total refugee arrivals over the past twenty-five years. 
Eight vessels carrying approximately 1,500 people brought 
as many refugee claimants as might arrive in just three 
weeks in any one of those twenty-five years.24 Yet, despite 
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the statistically insignificant number of refugee claimants, 
arrivals by ship garner disproportionate political attention.
The first recorded arrival of the modern period is the 
Japanese ship Komagata Maru, which arrived in May 1914 
carrying 376 South Asians who were marooned just off the 
Vancouver harbour. Following a two-month legal battle, the 
undesirable British subjects aboard the ship were refused 
the right to disembark and forced to return to India, where 
the passengers were imprisoned upon arrival and some 
killed.25 Once set, this precedent was maintained when 
the ship SS St Louis arrived in 1939 carrying just over 900 
Jewish refugees escaping the Holocaust. Upon its return to 
Europe, the asylum seekers faced arrest and death in con-
centration camps.26
The next set of ships that fuelled similar public outrage 
and legislative retaliation did not arrive until forty years 
later, after Canada had removed explicit racist references 
from its immigration policy, acceded to the 1951 Convention 
Relations to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol, and 
established its first refugee determination process of inland 
claims in the 1976 Immigration Act. In 1986, a ship carrying 
152 Tamils landed off the east coast of Newfoundland fol-
lowed by a separate arrival of 174 Sikhs off the coast of Nova 
Scotia. These unauthorized arrivals sparked public and 
policy concerns of illegality, fraud, deceit, and accusations 
of exploiting the generosity of Canadians. Prime Minister 
Brian Mulroney issued an emergency recall of Parliament 
to table Bill C-84, the Refugee Deterrents and Detention 
Bill, giving new powers to immigration officers to turn 
back ships in international waters if they were suspected of 
carrying claimants and made provisions for new fines to be 
imposed on carriers as well as new powers of search, seizure, 
and detention.27 In the year that Bill C-84 took to be passed 
and implemented, Canada also ratified the UN Convention 
against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment. In 1999, four ships from China 
carrying fewer than 600 passengers appeared off the coast 
of British Columbia evoking similar public and political 
indignation and put the deterrence effect of these earlier 
measures into question.
The racist responses to historical arrivals by ship in 
Canada strike a chord with contemporary political reac-
tions. The two most recent incidents of designated irregular 
arrivals and asylum seekers to Canada are the Ocean Lady 
in October 2009 and the MV Sun Sea in August 2010. The 
majority of the 500 Tamil passengers who arrived off the 
coast of British Columbia were detained immediately on the 
grounds that they were at “risk of flight.”28 The controversy 
engendered by these recent arrivals contributed to further 
legislative changes, adding to Canada’s already complex and 
lengthy refugee determination process.
Protecting Canada’s Immigration System Act (Bill C-31), 
originally named the Immigration and Refugee Protection 
Act, had its first reading in the House of Commons on 6 
April 2011. The bill died when an election was called later that 
year. The controversial Bill C-31 resurfaced as Protecting 
Canada’s Immigration System Act, carrying over modifi-
cations from Bill C-4, Preventing Human Smugglers from 
Abusing Canada’s Immigration System Act, and Bill C-11, 
Designated Countries of Origin. Bill C-11 would empower 
the minister to designate countries for which nationals 
would not have access to appeal decisions about their refu-
gee claims. Passed in June 2012 and brought into effect in 
December 2012, the act is intended to deal with the “refugee 
crisis” but has been criticized across the board by human 
rights advocates and scholars for gross violations of human 
rights.
At present, Canada accepts refugees through two streams: 
the Refugee and Humanitarian Resettlement Program 
and the In-Canada Asylum Program.29 Refugees arriv-
ing through the first program and the Private Sponsorship 
of Refugee Program arrive as permanent residents. The 
In-Canada Asylum Program allows people to make a claim 
at a port of entry or at a Citizenship and Immigration 
Canada office. If a claim is deemed eligible, it is sent to the 
Immigration and Refugee Board for a decision on refu-
gee status.30 This program is often the most controversial 
because Canada is unable to select persons who apply for 
asylum under this program, which it perceives as a threat to 
sovereignty, security, and national identity.
The Canadian state employs several measures to inter-
cept potential refugee claimants before arriving at a 
Canadian port of entry in order to make a claim. These 
measures include detention and removal, diplomacy, pros-
ecution and punitive measures, particularly against smug-
glers, transnational enforcement practices, and harmoniza-
tion of border policies such as the Canada–U.S. Safe Third 
Country Agreement, part of the Canadian federal Perimeter 
Strategy implemented in 2003.31 It is the persons who arrive 
and make a refugee claim under the In-Canada Asylum 
Program (refugee claimants) who hold temporary status in 
Canada.
Some Striking Similarities, Despite Distinctive 
Rationales for Admission
It would be too ambitious, given time and space constraints, 
to describe this article as comparative. Rather, the intention 
is to make a unique contribution to the much-needed dis-
cussion and debate on temporariness, and invite scholars 
to establish a research agenda that views Canada’s diverse 
temporary migrant groups as potentially theoretically and 
experientially linked. For my contribution, I draw on the 
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Protecting Canada’s Immigration Act and amendments to 
the Temporary Foreign Worker Program under Canada’s 
Economic Action Plan 2014, to reveal the ways in which 
the treatment of low-skilled temporary foreign workers and 
refugee claimants are the same or differ, and ideally some 
reflections on why.
The system of admission for both groups, based on the 
recent legislative changes noted above, is lengthier, compli-
cated, more onerous (albeit in different ways for temporary 
foreign worker and refugee claimants), and, in the case of 
the TFWP, more expensive. The implementation of Bill C-31 
significantly altered the claims process for asylum seekers 
who fall under the Safe Third Country Agreement or for 
those who are perceived to present security or criminality 
risks. It is interesting to note that the criteria to determine 
inadmissibility based on criminality both inside and out-
side of Canada has been significantly expanded.
One of the most important and controversial features 
of the bill is the creation of two streams of claimants: 
Designated Countries of Origin (DCO) and Designated 
Foreign Nationals (DFNs). The minister of citizenship and 
immigration now has the authority to designate countries 
whose nationals have reduced judicial, legal, and other 
rights in the refugee process. Designation is based on the 
minister’s opinion that the country may have independent 
judiciary or democratic rights or quantitative factors such 
as a rejection rate of claims of at least 75 per cent (including 
withdrawn and abandoned applications), or a withdrawn 
and abandoned rate of claims of at least 60 per cent. DFNs 
are groups of people that the minister of public safety desig-
nates as irregular arrivals or those who are suspected to 
have been smuggled for profit, and therefore their claims 
cannot be processed in a timely manner.32
As part of creating a fast and flexible streamlined refu-
gee determination process, nationals of DCO countries 
face shorter timelines for refugee hearings (30 to 45 days 
as opposed to 60 days for other claimants). The burden 
of proof rests with the claimant and with an increasing 
standard of proof required, the shorter timelines make it 
extremely challenging for claimants to acquire all docu-
ments and information to establish a successful claim in a 
timely manner. If unsuccessful in their claim, they cannot 
appeal to the Refugee Appeal Division. They are permitted 
to seek judicial review at the Federal Court but do not have 
an automatic stay of removal and have to wait 36 months 
before they can apply for a Pre-Removal Risk Assessment, 
all of which increases the potential for fast deportation. 
The designation of groups of people as “irregular arrivals” 
(DFN) subjects all persons over 16 years of age to mandatory 
detention. There is a growing body of evidence to suggest 
that detention puts an asylum seeker in the position of 
disempowerment, uncertainty, isolation, and humiliation, 
increasing the likelihood of depression and suicide.33 Even 
if they are accepted as persons in need of protection, they 
still face reduced rights and different treatment during the 
refugee status determination, including regular reporting 
to immigration authorities as well as a ban from travelling 
outside Canada for any reason.34
In the midst of the ongoing reform under Bill C-31, the 
Canadian government faced significant public, media, and 
trade union outrage, sparking significant changes to the 
TFWP. The administration of the TFWP is a jurisdictional 
conundrum, as the federal government has jurisdiction 
over the entry and stay of workers; however, the protec-
tion of workplace rights is a provincial responsibility, with 
the exception of Employment Insurance (a federal respon-
sibility). A key requirement under the TFWP is the Labour 
Market Opinion (LMO) process, which must be approved by 
Employment and Social Development Canada (ESDC, for-
merly known as Human Resources and Skills Development 
Canada, HRSDC).
Canada’s Economic Action Plan 2014 incorporated four 
changes to the LMO process, specifically in response to con-
troversial hiring of temporary foreign workers in BC and by 
RBC: (1) it suspended the accelerated LMO process previ-
ously applicable for prolonged or extensive (large numbers 
of workers) recruitment;35 (2) introduced a $275 user fee to 
eliminate the use of taxpayer money to facilitate the process; 
(3) added questions to restrict the outsourcing of Canadian 
jobs and ensure that employers have a firm plan in place 
to transition to a Canadian workforce over time; and (4) 
increased the government’s authority to suspend and revoke 
work permits and LMOs if they suspect that the program is 
being misused.36
Although programs for low-skilled TFWs import people 
who temporarily fill permanent vacancies, the LMO pro-
cess is more onerous for employers wanting to hire workers 
filling low-skilled positions in the Canadian labour market, 
as well as for the selected worker. Employers of prospect-
ive low-skilled workers are required to advertise on an 
ongoing basis and for a longer period of time and in more 
venues, targeting specific underemployed communities, 
and post specific wages. Employers must provide accom-
modation and accept responsibility for workers’ transporta-
tion costs to and from Canada, as well as their health-care 
costs for the first three months of their contract.37 Other 
critical changes were the removal of the wage flexibility that 
allowed employers to pay TFWs up to 15 per cent less than 
the prevailing wage, and changes to the language require-
ments identifying English and French as the only languages 
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that can be used for recruitment (a particular response to 
the outcry from BC with regard to the specific recruitment 
of Mandarin-speaking workers).38
Most refugee claimants across all provinces can apply to 
Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC) for a work per-
mit once their claims have been referred to the Immigration 
and Refugee Board (IRB). Not all refugee claimants who 
apply for a work permit get one. Unsurprisingly, a different 
set of rules applies to DCO claimants. They cannot apply 
for work permits until their refugee claims are accepted or 
180 days have passed since their claims were referred to the 
IRB.39 Refugee claimants who are unable to acquire a work 
permit must demonstrate that they cannot support them-
selves without work and that their only alternative is to go 
on social assistance. They must also have completed their 
medical examinations. For those refugee claimants who 
are already receiving social assistance, they should include 
proof of this when submitting their applications to CIC. 
Social assistance available to refugee claimants varies by 
province.40
The rights to social assistance extended to persons admit-
ted for humanitarian reasons in Canada does not extend to 
persons arriving as labour migrants, despite the fact that it is 
now recognized under international law and codified in the 
Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant 
Workers and Members of Their Families, which Canada has 
yet to ratify. Low-skilled TFWs are not entitled to social 
assistance anywhere in Canada; however, they make pay-
ments to the federal Employment Insurance program. An 
ESDC-approved employment contract provides workers 
with some protection, but ESDC has no regulatory author-
ity to monitor employer compliance.41 Legal protections in 
the workplace are dictated by province-wide employment 
standards, but these do not transfer well into practice for 
temporary foreign workers.
TFWs are unlikely to file a complaint against employers, 
and most workers have little or no experience with Canada’s 
legal and social systems, face language barriers, and are 
more likely to concede to self-censorship and to be influ-
enced by misleading information provided by employers. If 
and when a TFW does choose to contest a contractual vio-
lation through legal proceedings, the time constraints on a 
work visa present a practical barrier to successful litigation. 
The threat of possible detention, deportation, or repatria-
tion provides employers with an additional measure of con-
trol to exact over TFWs. Moreover, employers increasingly 
practise “country surfing”: fuelling competition between 
sending countries and threatening to switch supply coun-
tries if they are dissatisfied.42 Workers who wish to apply 
for a work permit with a new employer in the same industry 
are not authorized to work unless they undergo the LMO 
process once again, and the federal and the provincial gov-
ernment make little effort to match workers with employers 
who already possess an approved LMO.43
Despite the greater access to social assistance available 
for refugee claimants in comparison to low-skilled TFWs, 
the most recent reforms limit refugee claimants’ access to 
necessary and appropriate health care. The Interim Federal 
Health Program (IFHP) was established in 1957, delivered by 
Health Canada. Since 1995, CIC took over responsibility for 
providing eligible persons with immunizations, other pre-
ventative medical care, essential prescription medications, 
vision tests, some elective surgery, as well as prenatal and 
obstetrical care if they are not yet covered by a provincial 
and territorial health insurance plan.44
Pan-Canadian health organizations and professionals 
have voiced serious concerns about the Order Respecting 
the Interim Federal Health Program 2012. This order 
announced the ending of “health care coverage” for most 
pharmacy benefits and all vision, dental, and other supple-
mental benefits. The order also established ambiguous cri-
teria for what constitutes “basic coverage”;45 that is, prod-
ucts and services “of an urgent or essential nature.” For all 
others, including rejected refugee claimants as well as DCO 
and DFN claimants, coverage for physician and hospital ser-
vices is limited to services and products “needed to diagnose, 
prevent or treat diseases that pose a risk to public health, or 
conditions of a public safety concern,” therefore categoric-
ally excluding them from previous IFHP provisions.
Access to appropriate and necessary health care has always 
been and continues to be a point of concern for migrant 
workers in Canada. The focus has been on the potential 
risk associated with disease importation by migrant work-
ers; however, critical scholars have made the argument that 
this undermines the potential for adverse effects on migrant 
workers’ health. The majority of low-skilled TFWs live in 
employer-provided accommodation, which in the case of 
farm workers can be dilapidated and overcrowded quarters 
with poor sanitation, poor ventilation, inadequate means to 
refrigerate or heat food, and insufficient hygiene facilities. 
Migrant workers can also be found in occupations with ele-
vated workplace health and safety risks, and farm workers in 
particular experience common health problems with chem-
ical exposure, as well as single-event or long-term musculo-
skeletal injuries. In an attempt to protect their jobs and in 
fear of deportation, migrant workers may be more likely to 
work longer hours or dangerous shifts, accept unsafe work 
when injured or ill, and less likely to request safety equip-
ment or report workplace accidents.
Migrant workers holding legal employment authorizations 
are not eligible for publicly funded health care until three 
months following their arrival, during which they are eligible 
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to apply for private insurance. There are three potential bar-
riers to migrants purchasing private insurance: (1) an eco-
nomic barrier in that some may not possess the funds needed 
to buy insurance; (2) a geographical barrier, in that many 
migrants work in remote or rural areas where clinics may not 
recognize private insurance or have the necessary diagnostic 
equipment to cater to specific workplace injuries and health 
concerns; and (3) time barrier, in that many migrants work 
long hours and may not have the time to seek health care if 
their off-work hours do not coincide with clinic hours.46
All these risks are elevated for non-status migrant work-
ers who do not hold legal employment authorizations. 
Common barriers for both groups are linguistic and cultural 
differences, which may make persons within these groups 
less willing to seek treatment. Furthermore, medical profes-
sionals may not be trained to recognize the social context of 
migrant worker47 or refugee claimant health, resulting in a 
failure to acknowledge, address, and treat their health con-
cerns adequately.
Scholars have long contested the exploitation of low-
skilled TFWs, arguing that it has in fact become normal-
ized and concealed, and is being continually reproduced 
using the notion that permanent residents and citizens can 
expect certain rights and entitlements that are not available 
to non-citizens with temporary status. Numbers of tempor-
ary foreign workers who are granted permanent status has 
grown from 11.7 per cent in 2001 to 32.1 per cent in 2010 of 
all persons.48 It is integral to note, however, that this right 
is effectively denied to both groups: low-skilled temporary 
foreign workers as well as disadvantaged streams of refu-
gee claimants (DCO and DFN). The majority of low-skilled 
workers, including workers in the SAWP, are ineligible for 
permanent residence in Canada.
A dire consequence of the lack of a pathway to perma-
nent residence is consequent restrictions placed on family 
(re)unification. Joseph H. Carens notes that states intend to 
prevent permanent settlement by often requiring potential 
migrants to forgo their fundamental rights to family (re)
unification, as a condition of entry.49 In the past, Canada 
strategically restricted family reunification of Chinese and 
South Asian migrants in order to discourage the permanent 
settlement of these undesirable non-citizens. Contemporary 
examples include Designated Foreign Nationals who are 
barred from applying for permanent residence in Canada 
for five years, so family reunification is deferred. Moreover, 
the ban on travelling outside of Canada, if accepted as per-
sons in need of protection, also prolongs family separation. 
Although the TFWP has no regulatory bar to family mem-
bers accompanying workers to Canada, there is a double 
standard created by the differences in the accompanying 
spouse’s access to the labour market based on the skill level 
of the TFW. The spouse of a high-skilled TFW is eligible for 
an open work permit, and the couple’s children are entitled 
to study permits. In contrast, the spouse of a low-skilled 
worker must obtain an individual LMO, and the worker is 
required to cover the travel costs of his spouse and accom-
panying children, presenting an added economic barrier to 
family reunification and eventually settlement.
Conclusion
Albeit a brief discussion, this article reveals the latest chapter 
in Canada’s exclusionary migration history by tracking the 
trajectories of two specific categories of non-citizens—low-
skilled temporary foreign workers and refugee claimants—
who, despite being admitted to Canada on the basis of differ-
ent rationales, share some similarities and differences in their 
treatment by the host country. I show how the recent legis-
lative changes including Protecting Canada’s Immigration 
Act and the amendments to the Temporary Foreign Worker 
Program announced under Canada’s Economic Action Plan 
2014, have increased the occurrence and persistence of tem-
porariness for a growing number of non-citizens who live 
and work on the territory, but are systematically excluded 
from a wide range of rights, including access to work and 
provincial workplace standards, social assistance, family (re)
unification, permanent status, and entitlements to citizen-
ship. Although I did not present a robust comparison, in this 
concluding section, I highlight key arguments and provide 
future policy and research directions.
The system of admission for both groups is length-
ier, more complicated, more onerous for the migrants, 
more expensive in the case of the TFWP, and provides 
for increased chances of rejection and deportation. Since 
admitted under a different set of rules, refugee claimants 
have access to social assistance but reduced rights to work, 
while low-skilled temporary foreign workers face a more 
restrictive labour market opinion (work permit) process 
and are admitted with a right to work but without rights 
to social assistance anywhere in Canada. A set of barriers 
common to both groups are linguistic and cultural differ-
ences, which may make persons within these groups less 
willing to seek help or even treatment from medical profes-
sionals, who may also lack the training necessary to recog-
nize the social context of the migrant worker and/or refugee 
claimant. The recent changes to the Interim Federal Health 
Program limits refugee claimants’ access to necessary and 
appropriate health care, which has always been a point of 
concern for migrant workers. Both groups face policies that 
restrict family (re)unification and entitlements to perma-
nent status and citizenship.
There are some advantages available to one group that 
the other does not have access to; therefore, it would be 
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difficult to suggest any blanket policy solutions, since the 
specific needs of both groups do differ. It is also important 
to recognize that both groups differ significantly in the sheer 
numbers admitted to Canada at any specific time. Common 
to both groups, however, is a need for increased access to 
social assistance, especially for low-skilled temporary for-
eign workers. There is a greater need for better monitoring 
of employer compliance of ESDC-approved labour market 
contracts and adherence to provincial workplace standards. 
Both groups also require increased access to necessary and 
appropriate health care. There are drastic improvements 
required for low-skilled TFWs, and simultaneously an 
urgent need for serious reconsideration of changes to the 
IFHP affecting refugee claimants. Most importantly, per-
haps, is the need for increased opportunities to gain perma-
nent status in Canada, which for lower-skilled TFWs is truly 
an unjust paradox, since their high-skilled counterparts are 
automatically entitled to this privilege.
Finally, I would like to acknowledge that there has been 
a profusion of scholarship on temporariness as a theor-
etical framework, its consequences on the lived experience 
of migrants themselves,50 as well as changing public con-
sciousness and understandings of nationality in Canada.51 
This body of research has acknowledged the need to fully 
understand who enters temporary categories and what 
happens to them after they arrive in Canada. There is still, 
however, as I have stressed before,52 a tendency to consider 
temporariness in analytical and political silos, primarily on 
the basis of migrants’ category of and rationale for admis-
sion. I shall push once more for a systematic comparative 
and longitudinal account of who is temporary and, more-
over, who is able to transition from temporary to permanent 
status, as this can better inform policy design and stop the 
Canadian state from reverting to its dark exclusionary past.
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